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THE PLAYMATE: THE APPLICATION  
OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION AFTER  
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The probate exception to federal jurisdiction prohibits federal 
courts from hearing cases involving matters related to the probate of 
wills or administration of estates.1 It is a doctrine that has been 
described as “one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of the 
law of federal jurisdiction.”2 There are two primary policy 
justifications underlying this exception: first, since probate 
proceedings are in rem the federal courts cannot interfere with the state 
court’s control over estate property; second, the state courts are 
presumed to have proficiency in dealing with probate matters.3 But 
while the probate exception has traditionally been applied in the 
context of diversity jurisdiction cases, its applicability to federal 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Emory University, 1995. 
1 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946). 
2 Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982). 
3 Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Peter Nicolas, 
Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482-1483 (2001) (discussing various policy 
justifications for the probate exception). 
1
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question cases is less certain.4 Given that the purpose of federal 
question jurisdiction is to give federal courts the power to interpret 
federal law,5 should the probate exception apply to limit that 
authority? The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Marshall v. Marshall6 took a significant step towards clarifying the 
scope of the probate exception as applied to federal question cases, 
holding that it does not necessarily bar a federal court from hearing a 
probate-related matter in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.7 
However, though Marshall narrowed the applicability of the probate 
exception in the specific context of claims arising out of a federal 
bankruptcy case,8 it still left open the issue whether it applies to other 
federal question cases.9 
Not long after the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was faced with 
this very issue in Jones v. Brennan, a case which involved a claim 
                                                 
4 Compare Jones, 465 F.3d at 306 (holding the probate exception applicable in 
federal question cases), with Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 
1988) (holding that the exception only applies to diversity cases). There are also 
several secondary sources on the subject which refer to the exception specifically as 
the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Christian J. Grostic, A 
Prudential Exercise: Abstention and the Probate Exception to Federal Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 104 MICH. L. REV. 131 (2005); Shawn R. McCarver, Note, The 
“Probate Exception” to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate, 
48 MO. L. REV. 564 (1983); 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 936 (2006) (section 
is titled “Probate exception to diversity jurisdiction”); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 7 
(2006) (“Under the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction, a federal court may 
not probate a will, administer an estate, or entertain an action that would interfere 
with pending probate proceedings in a state court”). 
5 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 15 (4th ed. 2005). 
6 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006). 
7 Id. at 1746. 
8 Id. at 1746, 1748; see also Brian Hermann & Penny Dearborn, Supreme 
Court 2006: The Supremes Expand Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 25-AUG AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 48, 85 (July/Aug. 2006) (discussing how the Supreme Court 
expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction in Marshall and another recent case).  
9 See Jones, 465 F.3d at 306. 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of probate proceedings.10 In its 
analysis, the court cited Marshall as serving to clarify the scope of the 
exception.11 But rather than following the Supreme Court’s lead in 
interpreting the exception narrowly, the Seventh Circuit took a broader 
view and held it applicable to federal question cases.12 This Comment 
analyzes the effect that the Marshall decision has on cases involving 
the probate exception, specifically in the Seventh Circuit, and how that 
precedent should be used as a basis for formulating a clearer and 
narrower approach to the exception’s application to federal question 
cases. Part I provides background information on the history of the 
probate exception, and how it relates to federal jurisdiction. Part II 
discusses cases that applied the probate exception prior to Marshall. 
Part III examines the background facts and procedural history of 
Marshall. Part IV analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
Marshall in Jones v. Brennan, and suggests that it should have 
followed the narrowing trend evident in Supreme Court precedent and 
further restricted the parameters of the probate exception.  
 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION AND  
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
 
A. The Origins of the Probate Exception 
 
Though the probate exception is a doctrine that is well-established 
in the federal courts,13 its origins are not entirely clear. 14 It is often 
                                                 
10 Id. at 305. 
11 Id. at 306 
12 Id. at 306-07. 
13 Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Gregory C. 
Luke & Daniel J. Hoffheimer, Federal Probate Jurisdiction: Examining the 
Exception to the Rule, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 579 (1992) (“The probate exception is 
alive and well in all circuits; it survives with Supreme Court support.”). 
14 Jones, 465 F.3d at 306-07; Dragan, 679 F.3d at 713; see generally John F. 
Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB. L.J. 77 (1997) 
(tracing the evolution of the probate exception beginning with the eighteenth century 
English court system). 
3
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analogized to the domestic relations exception, which prohibits federal 
courts from hearing claims involving matters related to divorce, 
alimony, and child custody decrees.15 The most common explanation 
grounds the probate exception in the statutory grants of jurisdiction 
under the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1875, which provided that 
federal courts would have jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature 
at common law or in equity.”16 This language is generally interpreted 
with reference to the structure of the eighteenth-century English 
judicial system and the types of claims that could be brought in the 
various courts.17 American courts have read the phrase “at common 
law or in equity” as granting jurisdiction to those claims that could, in 
1789, have been brought in the English courts of common law and the 
High Court of Chancery (equity).18 Probate matters typically did not 
fall into the categories of law or equity, and were handled instead by 
the ecclesiastical courts.19 Therefore, issues involving probate were 
considered to be outside the scope of federal court jurisdiction.20 
                                                 
15 For more information on the domestic relations exception, see, for example, 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992); Michael Ashley Stein, The 
Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled 
Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669 (1995); 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal 
Courts § 948 (2006).  
16 The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts. 
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Federal question jurisdiction was 
granted by the Judiciary Act of 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 
470.  
17 For examples of decisions citing to the historical division of claims among 
the various types of English courts as the source of origin for the probate exception, 
see Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (2006); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 
490, 494 (1946); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F. 3d 304, 306-307 (7th Cir. 2006); Golden 
v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2004); Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Goerg v. Parungao, 
844 F.2d 1562, 1565 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988). 
18 See, e.g., Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1500. 
19 See, e.g., Golden, 382 F.3d at 357; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1500. For a 
thorough and detailed discussion of the historical jurisdiction of the English courts, 
see Winkler, supra note 14, at 78-88. In addition to probate of wills, the 
ecclesiastical courts also had exclusive jurisdiction over matrimonial issues, hence 
the relationship between the probate and domestic relations exceptions. See James E. 
4
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The accuracy of this historical interpretation of the probate 
exception’s origins has recently been questioned. For example, in the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dragan v. Miller, Judge Richard Posner 
pointed out two problems with the theory:  
 
First, there is no ecclesiastical court in America, and it 
is not obvious why the language of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 should be taken to refer exclusively to English 
rather than American courts. . . . Second, the scope of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court is 
very uncertain. In particular, it appears not to have 
extended beyond personal property; apparently the 
court of chancery had extensive jurisdiction over the 
inheritance of land.21 
 
Judge Posner’s skeptical view of this justification for the probate 
exception is shared by other courts and legal scholars as well. The 
Supreme Court described the exception as arising from “misty 
understandings of English legal history,”22 and recognized that the 
federal equity courts have jurisdiction over some probate-related 
claims, including “suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and 
other claimants against a decedent’s estate.”23 Additionally, a detailed 
account of the various interests involving probate matters and the 
relief available to enforce those interests in both English and Colonial 
                                                                                                                   
Pfander, The Playmate and the Probate Exception: The Probate Exception Lay 
Dormant for Decades, but Anna Nicole Smith’s Supreme Court Case Brought It 
Back to Life, 94 ILL. B.J. 320, 320 (2006). 
20 See, e.g., Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Winkler, supra note 14, at 1500-01. 
21 Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1981) (internal citations 
omitted). 
22 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens 
echoed this characterization, describing the statement in Markham that the English 
chancery courts lacked jurisdiction over probate matters as a “bald assertion” and a 
theory “only sporadically and tentatively cited as justification for the exception.” Id. 
at 1751. 
23 Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (internal citations omitted). 
5
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American courts reveals that the distinction among law, equity, and 
ecclesiastical claims may not be as clear-cut as courts have assumed.24 
Because of the confusion surrounding its historical origins, at least one 
scholar has characterized the probate exception as a “myth of federal 
law” which should be abandoned.25 This uncertainty, however, has not 
stopped federal courts from regularly applying the doctrine.26 
 
B.  The Relationship Between the Probate Exception  
and Federal Jurisdiction 
 
Modern federal court jurisdiction is defined by Article III of the 
United States Constitution,27 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.28 There 
is nothing in the language of these provisions that explicitly bars 
federal courts from hearing probate claims; rather the probate 
exception is an implied restriction on federal jurisdiction that has been 
developed through the common law.29 This raises an interesting 
question: why allow a common law doctrine to limit an exercise of 
                                                 
24 Winkler, supra note 14, at 78-101; see also Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1518-
19. 
25 Winkler, supra note 14, at 78, 152. 
26 Luke & Hoffheimer, supra note 13. 
27 Section 1, cl. 2 reads in pertinent part: “The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the 
United States.” 
28 The grant of federal question jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 
Stat. at 470, was later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1331: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.” Diversity jurisdiction originally granted by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at 78, is codified in 28 U.S.C. 1332(a):  
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of $ 75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between (1) 
Citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in 
which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; 
and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title as 
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States. 
29 Nicolas, supra note 14, at 1520. 
6
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federal jurisdiction that would otherwise meet the constitutional and 
statutory criteria?  
One way that courts have attempted to justify the restriction on 
federal jurisdiction is by characterizing the exception as statutory in 
origin.30 But since this historical foundation has been called into 
question,31 the exception has also been justified based on policy 
considerations. Among the policies claimed to be served by the 
probate exception are the promotion of legal certainty and judicial 
economy, respect for the expertise of the state courts in dealing with 
probate matters, and the interest in avoiding unnecessary interference 
with state probate system.32 This concern with the function of the state 
courts has led some scholars to advocate for an application of the 
probate exception based on the doctrine of prudential abstention.33 
Under the various theories of abstention, federal courts have discretion 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction to protect an “important 
countervailing interest” of a state.34 Therefore, it has been suggested 
that even if a probate-related claim appears to fall outside the 
parameters of the probate exception, courts should nonetheless 




                                                 
30 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
31 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
32 Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Nicolas, supra 
note 3, at 1483. 
33 See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1528-40, 1546; Grostic, supra note 4, at 
144. 
34 32A AM. JUR. 2D FEDERAL COURTS § 1229 (2006). For additional 
information on the types of abstention, see, for example, 17A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1528-41. 
35 Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1546; Grostic, supra note 4, at 144-149. 
7
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION  
PRIOR TO MARSHALL 
 
A. Markham v. Allen 
 
Markham v. Allen is an early decision in which the Supreme Court 
attempted to limit the applicability of the probate exception.36 In its 
opinion in Marshall, the Court described Markham as its “most recent 
and pathmarking pronouncement on the probate exception.”37 At issue 
in the case was whether there was federal jurisdiction over “a suit 
brought by the Alien Property Custodian against an executor and 
resident heirs to determine the Custodian’s asserted right to share in 
decedent’s estate which is in course of probate administration in a state 
court.” 38 In her will, California resident Alvina Wagner left property 
to several German citizens.39 Her heirs-at-law, six California residents, 
filed a petition in state court for a determination of heirship, claiming 
that they were entitled to Wagner’s estate because under California law 
“the German legatees were ineligible as beneficiaries.”40 As 
Custodian, Markham issued an order vesting in himself the interests of 
the German legatees.41 He then brought suit in federal court for a 
declaratory judgment that his was the sole interest in Wagner’s estate, 
and that the California heirs-at-law had no such interest.42  
                                                 
36 326 U.S. 490, 494-95 (1946); see also Hermann & Dearborn, supra note 8, 
at 85. 
37 Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (2006). 
38 Markham, 326 U.S. at 491-492. The petitioner’s role as an Alien Property 
Custodian was pursuant to § 5(b)(1)(B) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, § 301, 
55 Stat. 839 (as amended by the War Powers Act 1941). For more information on 
this statute and the authority granted to Alien Property Custodians, see Bethany Kohl 
Hipp, Comment, Defending Expanded Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign 
Assets and Transactions, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1311, 1316-1335 (2003). 
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Though the district court entered judgment in Markham’s favor,43 
the Ninth Circuit reversed citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due 
to the applicability of the probate exception.44 It reasoned that since 
the state probate court was “‘in possession of the property, its right to 
proceed to determine heirship cannot be interfered with by the federal 
court.’”45 The Supreme Court, however, held that the probate 
exception did not extend to the situation at hand.46 It articulated the 
following test for determining when the probate exception bars federal 
jurisdiction: 
 
[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction 
to disturb or affect the possession of property in the 
custody of a state court…it may exercise its jurisdiction 
to adjudicate rights in such property where the final 
judgment does not undertake to interfere with the state 
court’s possession save to the extent that the state court 
is bound by the judgment to recognize the right 
adjudicated by the federal court.47 
 
In applying this test, the Court concluded that the declaration of 
Markham’s sole interest in the estate did not qualify as an interference 
with the state’s possession of the property because “the effect of the 
judgment was to leave undisturbed the orderly administration of the 
decedent’s estate in the state probate court.”48 Since the power to 
administer the estate remained with the state court, the federal court 
was not attempting to exercise probate jurisdiction and therefore was 
not barred from hearing the claim.49 The Court, however, did not stop 
its analysis upon concluding that federal jurisdiction was proper, and  
                                                 
43 Id. at 493.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. (quoting Allen v. Markham, 147 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1945)). 
46 Markham, 326 U.S. at 495. 
47 Id. at 494 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
48 Id. at 495. 
49 Id.  
9
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went on to consider whether or not the district court should have used 
its discretion to decline to hear the suit because it involved issues of 
state law.50 It reasoned that such an exercise of discretion was 
unnecessary in this situation for two reasons: first because “[t]he mere 
fact that the district court . . . is required to interpret state law is not in 
itself a sufficient reason for withholding relief to petitioner”51; and 
second, because the district court was exercising power granted to it 
by a federal statute.52  
 
B. From Markham to Marshall: Confusion in the Federal Courts 
Regarding the Scope of the Probate Exception 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markham, the “[l]ower 
federal courts have puzzled over the meaning of the words ‘interfere 
with the probate proceedings.’”53 This confusion is manifested in two 
ways: first, there are several different tests used by the courts to 
determine the parameters of the exception;54 second there is 
disagreement regarding its applicability to federal question cases.55 
 
1. Overview of the Tests Applied in Probate Exception Analysis 
 
In response to the Supreme Court’s definition of the exception 
articulated in Markham, three primary tests have been developed by 
the lower courts to determine whether there is interference with state 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 495-96. Section 17 of the Trading with the Enemy Act “specially 
confers on the district court, independently of the statutes governing generally 
jurisdiction of federal courts, jurisdiction to enter ‘all such orders and decrees . . . as 
may be necessary and proper in the premises to enforce the provisions’ of the Act.” 
Id. (quoting the Trading with the Enemy Act, § 301, 55 Stat. 839). 
53 Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1748 (quoting Markham, 326 U.S. at 
494). 
54 See Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488; Grostic, supra note 4, at 133. 
55 Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006). 
10
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probate proceedings.56 The first is the nature of the claim test, which 
“examines the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, with the plaintiff’s 
position vis-à-vis the will being the dispositive factor. Under the 
‘nature of the claim’ test, if the plaintiff’s claim rests upon an assertion 
that the will is invalid . . . then the case falls within the probate 
exception.”57 An example of the application of this test can be seen in 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Moser v. 
Pollin.58 That case involved a dispute regarding a will that had been 
admitted to probate which left the decedent’s estate entirely to his 
sister to the exclusion of his only child.59 The court concluded that 
since the plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with inheritance 
was “in substance nothing more than a thinly veiled will contest,” it 
qualified as a “pure probate” matter over which the federal court was 
unable to exercise jurisdiction.60 
Another example of a test applied by courts is the route test. This 
test: 
 
[E]xamines the route that the suit would take had it 
been brought in state court. . . . [I]f the dispute under 
state law could be adjudicated only in a probate court, 
then there is no federal court jurisdiction. If, however, 
under state law the state courts of general jurisdiction 
would have jurisdiction over the dispute, then federal 
court jurisdiction exists.61 
 
This test was applied by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
in Lepard v. NBD Bank, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in 
the administration of a trust was held to be barred by the probate 
                                                 
56 The various tests are laid out in detail in Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488-92 
and Grostic, supra note 4, at 133-135. 
57 Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488.  
58 294 F.3d 335, 340-341 (2d Cir. 2002). 
59 Id. at 335. 
60 Id. at 340-341. 
61 Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1489. 
11
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exception because the state probate courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
over all probate matters.62 Though the application of the route test 
involves a fairly straight-forward interpretation of state law, it leads to 
inconsistent results since “the scope of the probate exception varies . . 
. according to the internal division of jurisdiction within each state 
between its probate courts and its courts of general jurisdiction.” 
The third and final test is referred to as the practical test. This 
approach was developed by Judge Posner and is applied in the Seventh 
Circuit.63 Under this approach, the probate exception applies when the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction would “impair the policies served by 
the probate exception.”64 In Dragan v. Miller, the court concluded that 
there was no jurisdiction over a tortious interference with inheritance 
claim based on weighing such factors as an interest in judicial 
economy, relative expertise of the state and federal court, and the 
promotion of legal certainty.65 Judge Posner focused on the fact that as 
a practical matter this claim was essentially a will contest, and because 
the procedure for will contests was governed exclusively by the 
Illinois Probate Code, the factors of judicial economy and relative 
expertise weighed heavily against an exercise of federal jurisdiction.66 
 
2. The Circuit Split Regarding the Applicability of the  
Probate Exception to Federal Question Cases 
 
The probate exception has typically been applied in cases based 
on diversity of jurisdiction.67 This is due to the fact that with probate 
                                                 
62 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004) 
63 The test was first articulated in Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 
1981). Another example of its application is Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
64 Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715. For more information on policy considerations see 
supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
65 Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715-16. 
66 Id. at 716. 
67 Jones v. Brennan, 465 U.S. 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006). As further evidence of 
this proposition, note that all of the cases discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, were based 
on diversity of jurisdiction. 
12
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cases, “the cause of action is usually either a breach of contract claim 
or a garden-variety state common law claim—such as fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligence, or wrongful death.”68 Its application to 
federal question cases, however, is not quite as certain.69 One court—
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit—explicitly stated the 
inapplicability of the probate exception to federal question cases in 
Goerg v. Parungao.70 The court pointed to Congress’ power to create 
bankruptcy jurisdiction and the preemption of state law in this area 
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to reach the 
conclusion that the probate exception “relates only to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 and has no bearing on federal question jurisdiction, the 
jurisdiction invoked in bankruptcy cases.”71 The Ninth Circuit, 
however, came to a contrary conclusion, “specifically reject[ing] the 
Goerg pronouncement and [holding] that the probate exception is 
applicable in bankruptcy cases.”72 It found the policy rationale of 
avoiding federal interference with state probate proceedings to be “as 
relevant to federal question cases as it is to diversity cases.”73 
 
III. MARSHALL V. MARSHALL: THE SUPREME COURT REVISITS THE  
ISSUE OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION 
 
When the Supreme Court decided Marshall in 2006, it was the 
first time it addressed the probate exception since Markham sixty 
years earlier.74 In an interesting twist, this “arcane” doctrine became 
the subject of renewed attention because of the quasi-celebrity 
marriage of a Playboy model to a billionaire over three times her age, 
                                                 
68 Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1494-95. 
69 Jones, 465 U.S. at 306.  
70 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988). 
71 Id. 
72 In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006). 
73 Id. 
74 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006). The Markham decision, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), is 
discussed in more detail supra Part II.A. 
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and the resulting dispute over his estate following his death.75 It was a 
battle that started in a Texas probate court, later moving to a California 
bankruptcy court and federal district court, to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and eventually being heard by the United States Supreme 
Court.76 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History of Marshall 
 
The petitioner in Marshall, Vickie Lynn Marshall, is better-known 
as Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith.77 In 1994, she married Texas 
billionaire J. Howard Marshall (“J. Howard”); he was 89 years old, she 
was 26.78 Just over a year after their marriage, J. Howard died, leaving 
a will that provided nothing for Vickie and named his son, Pierce, as 
the ultimate beneficiary.79 During the course of the proceedings in a 
Texas probate court regarding J. Howard’s will, Vickie filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in a California court.80 Pierce then filed a proof 
of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, claiming that Vickie had 
defamed him and the debt arising from her alleged defamation was not 
dischargeable.81 
                                                 
75 Pfander, supra note 19, at 320. 
76 The procedural history of the Marshall case is somewhat complicated, and 
involves two separate, but related claims heard by the Bankruptcy and District 
Courts of the Central District of California. The citations for these various decisions 
are provided as they are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
77 For more information than one could possibly want on Vickie Lynn 
Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, see, for example, http://www.annanicole.com 
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Nicole_Smith. As evidence of her popularity 
(notoriety?), a Google™ search for her name turned up 2.5 million results (as of 
December 2, 2006). For the remainder of this article, I will refer to her as “Vickie,” 
as that is the name under which the various claims at issue were brought. 
78 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741; Pfander, supra note 19, at 320. 
79 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741-42. 
80 Id. at 1742. The citation for the initial bankruptcy claim is In re Marshall, 
253 B.R. 550 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).  
81 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742. Pierce’s defamation claim was based on the 
allegation that Vickie’s lawyers told the media that he “had engaged in forgery, 
fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his father’s assets.” Id. (citing one of the 
14
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Vickie responded to Pierce’s defamation allegations asserting the 
defense of truth.82 She then counterclaimed against Pierce for tortious 
interference with an expected inheritance.83 Among the allegations 
made by Vickie in support of her counterclaim were that Pierce 
“effectively imprison[ed] J. Howard against his wishes; surround[ed] 
him with hired guards for the purpose of preventing contact between 
him and Vickie . . . and transfer[ed] property against J. Howard’s 
expressed wishes.”84 The bankruptcy court found in Vickie’s favor and 
awarded damages in the amount of nearly $450 million (less whatever 
she received out of the Texas probate proceedings), plus punitive 
damages.85 In addition, in a second, related bankruptcy court 
proceeding, the court held that it had the authority to enter judgment 
on the tortious interference counterclaim because it qualified as a 
“core proceeding” to a case brought under title 11.86 
                                                                                                                   
two opinions entered by the District Court of the Central District of California, In re 
Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002). Pierce claimed that the debt arising 
from the alleged defamation would not be dischargeable because it involved 
“‘willful and malicious injury by the debtor.’” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. For additional information on tortious interference with inheritance, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979) (“One who by fraud, duress or 
other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third 
person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to 
liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).  
84 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742. 
85 In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 553, 561. 
86 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742-1743; In re Marshall, 257 B.R. 35, 39-40 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000). Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), “[b]ankruptcy judges may 
hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under 
title 11, or arising in a case under title 11…and may enter appropriate orders and 
judgments[.]” A core proceeding is defined as including “counterclaims by the estate 
against persons filing claims against the estate[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), which 
the Bankruptcy Court believed was sufficient to bring Vickie’s counterclaim against 
Pierce under its authority to enter a final judgment, In re Marshall, 257 B.R. at 39-
40. If a claim is not considered to be a core proceeding, then a bankruptcy judge may 
still hear the case, but instead of entering a final judgment, proposed findings and 
conclusions are submitted to the district court for de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 
157(c)(1).  
15
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Pierce contested the judgment of the bankruptcy court on the 
grounds that the tortious interference claim could only be heard by the 
Texas probate court, and that the probate exception barred the 
bankruptcy court from considering it or entering a final judgment.87 
The bankruptcy court rejected Pierce’s probate exception argument as 
not being timely raised and therefore waived as grounds for a 
challenge of subject matter jurisdiction.88 It also engaged in a brief 
analysis of whether the exception is even applicable to federal 
question cases, concluding that it should be narrowly construed to 
permit federal courts to hear claims other than those involving 
“probating of a will, administering a decedent’s estate, or assuming 
control of property in the custody of the state court.”89  
Upon review, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California upheld the bankruptcy court’s determination that 
the probate exception was not a bar to federal jurisdiction over 
Vickie’s tortious interference claim, but it applied a different 
analysis.90 The district court disagreed with the determination that 
Pierce had waived his probate exception argument,91 but ultimately 
concluded that such an argument was not applicable to the issue at 
hand because there was no interference with the Texas probate 
proceeding.92 In addition to this holding, the district court also 
expressed as dictum its belief that the probate exception “likely applies 
to all matters in federal court, not just those premised on diversity 
jurisdiction.”93 
After an intermediate bankruptcy proceeding in the Central 
District of California in which the original findings were modified and 
adopted,94 the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.95 The Ninth 
                                                 
87 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742. 
88 In re Marshall, 257 B.R. at 38. 
89 Id. at 37-38. 
90 In re Marshall, 264 B.R. 609, 619-625 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
91 Id. at 619 
92 Id. at 621. 
93 Id. at 620. 
94 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
16
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Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that even 
though Vickie’s claim “does not involve the administration of an 
estate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter,”96 the 
federal courts were nonetheless barred from hearing claim by the 
probate exception.97 The court reached this conclusion based on its 
broad interpretation of the exception as reaching “not only direct 
challenges to a will or trust, but also questions which would ordinarily 
be decided by a probate court in determining the validity of the 
decedent’s estate planning instrument. Such questions include fraud, 
undue influence upon a testator, and tortious interference with the 
testator’s intent.”98 Vickie’s claims, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, 
were a “disguised attack” on the disposition of J. Howard’s property 
under a trust instrument and therefore within the scope of the probate 
exception.99 
 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Narrow View of the Probate Exception 
 
After the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court judgments 
entered in Vickie’s favor,100 she appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court.101 The Court granted certiorari “to resolve the apparent 
confusion among federal courts concerning the scope of the probate 
exception.”102 The Court ultimately agreed with the district court that 
the probate exception was not applicable to Vickie’s claims,103 and 
criticized the Ninth Circuit for the “sweeping extension” of its 
application.104 
                                                                                                                   
95 In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) 
96 Id. at 1133. 
97 Id. at 1137. 
98 Id. at 1133. 
99 Id. at 1137. 
100 Id. 
101 Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006). 
102 Id. at 1744. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1741. 
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The Supreme Court supported its narrow interpretation of the 
probate exception based on a similar approach taken in Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 105 a case involving the domestic relations exception to 
federal jurisdiction.106 In Ankenbrandt, the plaintiff brought suit 
against her ex-husband and his companion seeking damages for sexual 
abuse of the plaintiff’s children.107 The Court reversed the finding of 
the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that the 
plaintiff’s tort claim fell within the domestic relations exception and 
could therefore not be heard by the federal courts.108 The domestic 
relations exception, the Court noted, should only apply to divest 
federal courts of jurisdiction over such narrow issues as “divorce, 
alimony, and child custody decrees.”109 It reasoned that while state 
courts are proficient in dealing with such matters, “federal courts are 
as equally equipped to deal with complaints alleging the commission 
of torts.”110 Therefore, if the domestic relations exception is to be 
construed narrowly, then given their similar origins, the probate 
exception should be as well.111 
The Marshall Court’s attempt to limit the applicability of the 
probate exception builds on its earlier articulation of the exception’s 
scope in Markham.112 It recognized the confusion caused by the 
language “‘interfere with the probate proceedings,’”113 and offered the 
following clarification of the phrase:  
 
                                                 
105 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
106 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1744-45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text 
for further information regarding the domestic relations exception. 
107 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1744-45 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 691). 
108 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1745 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 692, 706-
707). 
109 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. 
110 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1746 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704). 
111 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1746. 
112 Id. at 1747-48; see the discussion of Markham, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), supra 
Part II.A. 
113 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1747-48 (quoting Markham, 326 U.S. at 494) 
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[W]e comprehend the ‘interference’ language in 
Markham as essentially a reiteration of the general 
principle that, when one court is exercising in rem 
jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume 
in rem jurisdiction over the same res. Thus, the probate 
exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or 
annulment of a will and the administration of a 
decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts from 
endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the 
custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar 
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those 
confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.114 
 
The Court then analyzed Vickie’s claims under this standard.115 
First, her claims did not involve a matter of pure probate, such as 
probating a will or administering an estate, but rather alleged the 
“widely recognized tort” of tortious interference with inheritance.116 
Second, she sought in personam jurisdiction over her stepson, Pierce, 
and did not seek to gain control over property in the custody of the 
state court.117 Furthermore, the Court found no policy justification for 
applying the probate exception to this situation because “[t]rial courts, 
both federal and state, often address conduct of the kind Vickie 
alleges. State probate courts possess no ‘special proficiency…in 
handling [such] issues.’”118 Based on this analysis, the Court held that 




                                                 
114 Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1748 (internal citations omitted). 
115 Id.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1748-49 (quoting Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)). 
119 Id. at 1746. 
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBATE 
EXCEPTION AFTER MARSHALL 
 
A. Jones v. Brennan 
 
In Jones v. Brennan, the Seventh Circuit had its first opportunity 
to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall.120 Lois Jones 
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County probate 
judges, the county’s public guardian and two of his deputies, and four 
private lawyers appointed by the court as guardians ad litem, and 
requested compensatory and punitive damages.121 She claimed that the 
defendants “conspired to deprive her of property without due process 
of law in the course of probate proceedings involving her father’s 
estate.”122 In her complaint, Jones made a number of allegations, 
including that the probate judges communicated ex parte with the 
guardians and failed to require guardians to provide accountings of the 
estate, that the guardians and Jones’s siblings bargained for certain 
estate property, that illegal searches were conducted of Jones’s 
belongings by the guardians, and that Jones was prevented from 
spending time with her father before his death due to false reports 
made by the guardians to convince the court to enter a protective order 
against her.123 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction based on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal courts other than the 
Supreme Court of the United States from hearing an appeal from a 
                                                 
120 465 F.3d 304, 305-06 (7th Cir. 2006). 
121 Id. at 305. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. At the time of commencement of probate proceedings, Jones’s father 
was still alive. Since he was incapable of handing his own affairs, his estate was 
already in the control of the probate court. He died while the proceedings were still 
ongoing. Id. 
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decision made by a state court.124 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with the district court’s dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman, 
since the federal suit was filed before the state court proceedings 
regarding the estate of Jones’s father were completed, and matters 
were raised that were not included in the state court claim.125 The 
Seventh Circuit was instead concerned with a different jurisdictional 
issue: whether or not Jones’s claims would be barred from being heard 
in federal court by the probate exception.126 
In considering whether the probate exception applied to Jones’s 
claims, the Seventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Marshall as clarifying of the scope of its application.127 As stated by 
the Supreme Court, and reiterated by the Seventh Circuit, the probate 
exception “‘precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of 
property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not 
bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and 
otherwise within federal jurisdiction.’”128 The court recognized, 
however, that this standard is not without its ambiguities. While the 
exception’s applicability in diversity cases is well-established,129 the 
Seventh Circuit pointed out that “courts are divided over its 
applicability to federal-question cases, such as [Jones].”130 Joining the 
Ninth Circuit, and disagreeing with the Eleventh, the Seventh Circuit 
held the exception applicable to federal question cases.131 
                                                 
124 Id. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is so-named for the two cases which 
articulated the concept: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
125 Marshall, 465 F.3d at 305. Matters raised in the federal suit that weren’t 
included in the state suit included the alleged bargaining between the guardians and 
the siblings and the denial of access between Jones and her father. Jones v. Brennan, 
465 F.3d 304, 305 (7th Cir. 2006); 
126 Marshall, 465 F.3d at 306. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1748 (2006)). 
129 See sources cited supra note 4. 
130 Jones, 465 F.3d at 306. 
131 Id. The cases cited by the Seventh Circuit in its discussion of the circuit 
split are In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (probate exception 
21
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The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion as a matter of 
statutory interpretation.132 After engaging in a brief discussion of the 
history of the probate exception,133 the court looked to the evolution of 
the jurisdictional statutes to support its conclusion that the probate 
exception is indeed applicable to federal question cases.134 It reasoned 
that because Congress did not significantly alter the language of the 
statutes granting jurisdiction to the federal courts after the probate 
exception had become established, the intention was that it would 
apply to federal-question as well as diversity cases.135 Furthermore, it 
found the two primary policy justifications behind the exception to be 
equally applicable in both types of cases: first, since the actions 
involve a res under the control of a state court, another court should 
not be able to interfere; and second, the state courts are believed to be 
more proficient at handling probate-related matters.136 Finally, the 
court did not see a problem with applying the exception to federal 
question cases, concluding that “since state courts are authorized to 
decide issues of federal law unless Congress decrees otherwise, 
confining a class of federal-law cases to state courts does not deprive 
litigants of their federal rights.”137 
The court next considered each of Jones’s claims to determine if 
they were barred by the probate exception.138 With regard to the claim 
of “maladministration of her father’s estate,” the court expressed the 
belief that the probate exception clearly applied because the plaintiff 
was essentially “asking the district court to take over the 
                                                                                                                   
applies to federal question cases) and Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (probate exception only applies to diversity cases). See supra Part II.B.2 
for a more detailed discussion of these cases. 
132 Jones, 465 F.3d at 306-07. 
133 See supra Part I.A for a more detailed discussion of the historical origins of 
the probate exception. 
134 Jones, 465 F.3d at 307. 
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 307-08. 
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administration of the estate.”139 However, the application of the 
probate exception was not as clear with respect to some of the other 
claims, such as the alleged deprivation by the court officials and 
guardians of the plaintiff’s property interest in her father’s estate 
without due process.140 The court concluded: “Though we are dubious 
that any of the plaintiff’s federal claims are outside the probate 
exception, the matter is not so clear that the judgment dismissing the 
case on jurisdictional grounds can be sustained without further probing 
in the district court.”141  
 
B. Issues with the Seventh Circuit’s Application 
 of the Probate Exception 
 
In its approach to the application of the probate exception in 
Jones, the Seventh Circuit displayed some inconsistencies with its own 
precedent as well as that of the Supreme Court. First, in Dragan the 
court pointed out that the historical basis for interpreting the scope of 
the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction was severely flawed.142 But 
in Jones, it cited that very same historically-based interpretation of the 
statutory language as the reason the probate exception should apply to 
federal question cases.143 Second, though the Seventh Circuit has 
developed a test to determine the applicability of the probate 
exception,144 it did not appear to implicate that test at all in its 
discussion of the plaintiff’s claims. And finally, the court seems to be 
expanding the parameters of the probate exception in spite of attempts 
by the Supreme Court to limit its applicability. Taken together, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Markham and Marshall indicate a trend 
towards narrowing the application of the probate exception, 
                                                 
139 Id. at 307. 
140 Id. at 308. 
141 Id. 
142 See supra Part I.A.1, specifically note 21 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
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particularly when there is an issue of federal law involved.145 In earlier 
cases, the Seventh Circuit itself also advocated for a narrow 
interpretation.146 Yet in Jones, the court took a contrary approach and 
adopted an expanded view of the exception, holding it applicable to 
federal question cases without any further qualification or guidance to 
the lower courts as to application of this rule moving forward.147  
Such an extension of the exception is arguably unnecessary, since 
the concerns about avoiding interference with state law are not nearly 
as compelling in a federal question case as they are in cases premised 
on diversity.148 A litigant should have the opportunity to have a 
legitimate federal question heard by a federal court, regardless of 
whether that federal issue implicates probate matters. The Seventh 
Circuit should therefore adopt an approach to the application of the 
probate exception that weighs the federal interest more strongly 
against the state interest when a federal question is involved. First, the 
court should interpret narrowly the types of claims that even trigger 
the probate exception analysis, limiting it to “pure probate” matters 
such as probating a will and administering an estate or those that seek 
control over property that is already in possession of a state court. If 
the exception is in fact implicated, then the next step would be an 
abstention-type analysis.149 This would give precedent to the federal 
interest while still taking into account any compelling interest the state 
may have in litigating the matter. 
  
                                                 
145 See supra Parts II.A and III.B 
146 The court stated that it “had cautioned that the probate exception, as a 
judicially created exception to the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction, should be 
construed narrowly.” Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 
471, 475 (7th Cir. 1979). 
147 465 F.3d at 306. 
148 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
24
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/3





Despite being a source of great confusion, federal courts seem 
reluctant to abandon the probate exception. The Supreme Court, 
through its decisions in Markham and Marshall, appears to be taking 
steps to narrow the application of the exception, particularly when 
there is an issue of federal law involved. The Seventh Circuit in Jones, 
however, disregarded this narrowing trend by holding that the 
exception applies to federal question cases. The court instead should 
have adopted an approach that limits the application of the exception 
in the specific context of federal question cases. Such an approach 
would be consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, as well as 
the policy concerns underlying federal question jurisdiction. 
 
25
Nagler: The Seventh Circuit Turns a Blind Eye to the Playmate: The Applic
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
